

DOKDO/TAKESHIMA AND THE JAPANESE AND KOREAN MEDIA

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ABSTRACT

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The dispute between South Korea and Japan over the Dokdo/Takeshima islands has persisted since 1952, and news media analyses show that views and discourse on the conflict have become more heated in the years since. The existing relationships between political decision-makers, mass media, public opinion, and other conflicts between the two nations have fostered this growing resentment. Political opinion and mass media have pushed decision-makers to act in a way that exacerbates and further destabilizes the conflict. The key to de-escalating this dispute, reducing nationalist ideals surrounding it, and building a better relationship between South Korea and Japan may lie in altering the relationships that currently exist within the event sphere of this conflict.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

South Korea and Japan have been embroiled in a dispute regarding sovereignty over a set of islets known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan for nearly seventy years. The dispute has been the source for a fair amount of animosity between the two nations, with each nation criticizing the other every few months for unfair or uncalled-for actions to further impose their individual territorial claim. The South Korean government prevented Japanese policymakers with an interest in the Dokdo/Takeshima islets from entering South Korea. A couple of years later, the Japanese government refused a Korean actor entry to Japan after he voiced his support for South Korea's claim to the islets.

Every few years, the South Korean news media includes a fair amount of coverage on a new set of textbooks in Japan that state the islets belong to them. Both nations' news media criticize each other's governments' actions on the dispute and never attempt to justify why the other nation feels they have rightful sovereignty of the islets. The constant back-and-forth by the news media seems almost petty at its surface, which may be an indicator that the topic is a point of interest for readers.

The involvement of media in this dispute is not unique. In fact, the media are an essential actor in any political conflict, as they provide the public with informational updates on issues that may affect them and deliver that information with biases from various social, cultural, and political influencers. Intense news coverage of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets suggests not only the importance of the topic, but also that the news media may be an important actor in the dispute that could have the power to change the discourse surrounding the dispute and potentially act as a leader towards resolution.

This thesis seeks to determine the role that the South Korean and Japanese news media play in the Dokdo/Takeshima geopolitical dispute through consideration of who the news media influence, who influences the news media, and how the news media may be used to encourage resolution of the dispute.

Terms

Many sources referenced use different terms to refer to institutions that provide informative news. The most popular of these terms are “media” and “mass media”. Using either of these terms seems inadequate, however, as they may both refer to a very wide variety of consumable forms of information. “Media” on its own may refer to such media as film, literature, television, print newspapers, posters, and so many other items. “Mass media”, though more narrow in definition, is also not quite the correct term. While it once may have almost exclusively referred to newspapers, radio, and the likes, it now also encompasses social media platforms. A more apt term to describe the forms of media I refer to is the news media—any form of media, though most frequently articles, that inform consumers of notable and potentially impactful events.

Additionally, throughout this thesis I will refer to the disputed islands as “Dokdo/Takeshima” rather than just one nation’s name or the western name, “Liancourt Rocks”, that rarely appears in any sources cited in this thesis.

Background

The islets in question in this dispute between Japan and South Korea are known as Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan. In some other areas of the world, they are known as the Liancourt rocks, after a French boat that happened upon the islets. The islets lie approximately 217 kilometers from the Korean peninsula and 211 kilometers from the main island of Japan

(“Takeshima”) and are made up of two main islets and many smaller rocks and reefs protruding from the ocean.

Resources & Exclusive Economic Zone Claims

The islets themselves do not have many resources. They are mostly barren land with very little vegetation. However, the surrounding water is lucrative for fishing and is speculated to be a good source of natural gas (Ch'oe). The current dispute over the islets includes economic concern regarding who has rights to fish in the area and who will be allowed access to the natural gas from the sea floor. Both countries include Dokdo/Takeshima in their economic exclusion zones, laying claim to their right to fish, minerals, and natural gasses in the waters and sea beds (Fern 82). Over the years, numerous fishing agreements have addressed this overlap by establishing a joint fisheries control zone (Pedrozo 133). Under these agreements, both countries are held to a maximum annual fishing catch by weight. However, no decision has been made on accessing the gasses, as neither country has the ability to extract the gasses yet.

Sovereignty Over Time

Both South Korea and Japan want access to the resources found in the waters surrounding the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. However, the dispute over the islets is not only founded in economic concerns. Ownership over the island is also a point of autonomy and pride for both countries. The histories of the two nations are closely intertwined, and there are still several issues to be settled from more recent historical events; most specifically the Japanese colonial rule of Korea between 1910 and 1945. Each country has often contested the other's collective memory of and stances on historical issues that originated during this time.

In 1905, just prior to the Japanese colonial rule of South Korea, Japan sought ownership of the islets. The islets were described as uninhabited land and their location was noted by

coordinates, making Takeshima clearly identifiable as the islets of Dokdo. The Japanese cabinet charged with incorporating the territory claimed *terra nullis* over the land, as there was no sign of occupancy by any other country, but a Japanese citizen *had* been hunting sea lions from the island since 1903. Japan retained control of the islets until the end of World War II and the subsequent Korean claim to the islets.

The San Francisco treaty of 1951 that officially ended Japanese control of other nations did not include any clear indication as to the ownership of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. Article II of the treaty reads, “Japan recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title, and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton, and Daeguele” (“Treaty of Peace with Japan”), effectively leaving the ownership of Dokdo/Takeshima up to interpretation. Korea began exercising its claim to the islets by stating that Korea had historically governed the area, citing an imperial edict from 1900 ordering the incorporation of the islets, and that Japan never had a rightful claim to the territory and therefore that Japan should have renounced their claim to the islets as per the San Francisco treaty (Takashi 1). The ambiguity in international law regarding claim over the islets has driven divide between both countries’ perceptions of historical and legal ownership over the territory.

Since the San Francisco treaty, both nations have sought historical references to their nation’s sovereignty over the island through maps, governance orders, and sailors’ accounts, but much of those accounts overlap or are not quite clear on where the named territories were located. Analyses of the dispute have noted the fact that this dispute arose with the end of the Second World War, when international treaties were founded upon this western form of international order. Prior to the introduction of a western-originated world order, much of East Asia had existed under a Sinocentric order, wherein China stood at the center of an international

Asian community. The Sinocentric order “never developed the notion of legal equality between states in this system” (Walker 199) as states under the order operated as vassals and thus the strict demarcation of national boundaries was not a necessity. In the early 15th century, Japan developed its own system of governance, the Tokugawa system, which established sub-national governments that were able to make international trades and deals. While this established a clearer demarcation of territory for Japan, maps of Japan’s coastlines remained incomplete or inaccurate (205). Once the Takugawa system collapsed in 1868, Japan adopted a more western system of international order and shortly thereafter sought imperialism and quickly and violently gained territory; lingering territorial ambiguities from the Takugawa system and the Sinocentric order was no longer a concern for Japan.no longer mattered. The introduction of the San Francisco Treaty post-Japanese imperialism, though, suddenly forced a clear demarcation of land ownership that had not previously been established by countries in the region, leaving ample room for territorial disputes to rise between Japan and China, Russia, and South Korea (200). Much of the historical evidence dragged up by either South Korea or Japan reflects the historical geopolitical ambiguity of the region, leaving no clear understanding of who had sovereignty over the islets when.

Other Disputes

This dispute over Dokdo/Takeshima is only one of many disputes between Korea and Japan arising from their shared history. The geographical dispute between the two nations further extends to the dispute over the body of water between them, in which Dokdo/Takeshima is located. While the common term for the name internationally is “Sea of Japan” (as, Japan argues, it has most popularly been called since the 17th century), South Korea contends that it has been

called “East Sea” on maps dating back 2,000 years and thus should be officially named “East Sea” (Dudden).

Additionally, the fallout of Japanese colonial rule over Korea created understandable friction between the countries that remains to this day. The greatest friction arises from the dispute over the comfort women issue. During World War II, the Japanese military was involved in recruiting and organizing South Korean women into what was in all but name sexual slavery for Japanese soldiers. These women were known as “comfort women” and were made available to Japanese soldiers at “comfort stations”. After Japan’s occupation of Korea ended, the stories of these women slowly came to light as the women began suing the Japanese government for their abuse. At first, the Japanese government denied any involvement in organizing “comfort women” and “comfort stations”, but as the issue gained a larger spotlight internationally the government eventually admitted to minor involvement. However, even as the issue gained traction and both activists and the South Korean government demanded acknowledgement by and compensation from the Japanese government, Japan denied owing any compensation to the Korean women (Kimura 4-16). The Japanese government did eventually agree to formally apologize and pay compensation to the 46 still-living former “comfort women” in 2015, but South Korea later found the settlement to be inadequate (Rich). This issue continues to create a deep divide between the two nations to this day.

Another point of contention between South Korea and Japan stemming from Japanese activity in World War II is the Yasukuni shrine. The shrine is a religious monument in Japan that honors Japanese citizens—be they soldiers or civilians—who have died for Japan since 1869. Of the 2.5 million people buried there, a little over 1,000 are convicted war criminals. Japanese leaders regularly visit the shrine to pay respects, but every time they do so it causes other nations

in the region, including South Korea, to react with animosity. The shrine also contains a museum that “sanitizes” the history of World War II. To South Koreans, these visits symbolize respect for the war criminals and a disregard for Japan’s wrongdoings during the war. (Woolf)

An estimated 60,000 cultural Korean artefacts are yet another point of contention between the nations. The South Korean government believes these artefacts to have been stolen and shipped to Japan during its colonial era. Japan returned some artefacts per a 1965 agreement, and in 2010 returned several more (“Japan Agrees”). South Korea continues to resent Japan for keeping tens of thousands of stolen artefacts while Japan firmly considers previous agreements to return artefacts as final.

Sovereignty of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets is important to both Japan and South Korea for a handful of reasons. Definitive ownership of the islets would clearly dictate through territorial boundaries who is allowed to freely access economic resources available in the waters surrounding the islets, and would also resolve one of the several long-standing historical disputes that originated from Japanese imperialism in Korea. A resolution to the dispute may be a step towards solving the other imperialist-era disputes between the countries, but it may also add fuel to the fire. One nation gaining internationally-recognized sovereignty of the islets could imply that that nation was “in the right” on the dispute, which in turn might fuel further argumentation over the other disputes in an attempt by the “winning” nation to “win” other disputes and by the “losing” nation to ensure that it doesn’t “lose” other disputes.

CHAPTER 2: INTERACTION BETWEEN THE MEDIA, THE PUBLIC, AND THE STATE

Event Sphere

News media have always been closely intertwined with politics and the public. In the United States, journalism is considered the fourth estate of the government, meant, among other duties, to keep citizens informed of political events and actions. Kovach and Rosenstiel state that “the primary purpose of journalism is to provide citizens with the information they need to be free and self-governing” (Kovach and Rosenstiel 18), and they further delve into the obligations of journalism that arise from their purpose, including acting as “an independent monitor of power” and providing “a forum for public criticism and compromise (12). With this understanding, the relationship between news media, politics, and the public is at the surface a very clear one: political decisions or events occur and are covered in the news for the benefit of the citizens.

However, politics itself is not so simple. A single political action or decision is influenced by something or several somethings; decisions are made and actions are taken by decision makers; and those decisions and actions have resulting effects on other people and institutions, including news media and public opinion.

Similarly, the role of news media is not as simple as the ideal proposed by Kovach and Rosenstiel. News media do not act simply as a conveyor belt that delivers information to the public; in passing along information to the public, news media frame that very information, packaging it up to direct the consumer’s focus to a particular viewpoint. The consumer will then form their beliefs and opinions about the information based on how that information is framed by the writer.

Baum and Potter describe the role of mass media (news media) in its relationship with the public as an independent, causal variable. That is not to say, however, that mass media is not influenced by any outside actors, nor that the public does not in turn influence the media. When covering any event, outside actors such as government officials and public opinion may influence how the news media covers the event and what influence the news media may have over other actors. When foreign relations and international events come into play, the news media becomes part of a web of relationships that includes foreign actors and foreign policy. The total amalgamation of research by foreign policy and media scholars, as Baum and Potter summarize, can be simplified to the relationships shown in Figure 1 (“Further investigation into these narrow individual pathways,” they state, “is likely to produce diminishing returns.”




Figure 1: Causal relationships between the mass media, public, opinion, and foreign policy

The relationships between each of these actors are as follows:

1. Mass Media → Public Opinion

The mass media deliver information to the public through framed coverage. Coverage may be framed to be “compatible with standing public interests” that “may ‘activate’ public attention” or may use a frame set by the elite (decision makers; the government), providing a certain perspective of an event and influencing public opinion (Baum and Potter 55).

2. Public Opinion → Mass Media

The mass media respond to the public, who are the consumers of their delivered information. The public “observes and responds to a framed representation of reality” (57). As will be discussed, if a media source relies on engagement or funding from the public (i.e. through purchasing a print paper or subscriptions), the mass media will tend to be more responsive to the public than to other actors in order to maintain reader interest and increase audience size. Mass media will do this by framing information in such a way that it supports public opinion.

3. Decision Makers → Mass Media

The mass media similarly respond to decision makers, or the elite, as they provide a hefty amount of news content. This dynamic puts pressure on the mass media (especially sources funded directly by its readers) to reflect the elites’ framing of news updates and insights in order to maintain a relationship with the elite that allows the mass media to continue receiving information. (49)

4. Mass Media → Decision Makers

The mass media, in addition to reflecting the views of the elite (thereby legitimizing those views in the eyes of the public), are also able to criticize the government by “[emphasizing] a contrary frame” (55) set either through public opinion or autonomous

agenda-setting, effectively rejecting government views in the eyes of the public. Such criticism may influence governmental policy decisions in order to retain support from the public.

5. Public Opinion → Decision Makers

Decision makers may seek to retain support from the public as they make policy decisions. As such, they may make decisions based on predicted or potential public response. (55)

6. Decision Makers → Public Opinion

A public is more likely to support government decisions or actions, regardless of their consequences, if there is high consensus among the elite – that is, if the public can observe support for the decisions or actions from a greater number of decision makers. A lower degree of elite consensus may result in the collapse of public support. (46-47)

7. Public Opinion → Foreign Actors

Foreign actors, in recognizing how another nation's public opinion influences domestic decision makers and activity, may change their approach to a situation. (Putnam et al. 402)

8. Mass media → Foreign Actors

The mass media influence how foreign actors view a nation and its affairs, which in turn influences how foreign actors approach their own foreign policy decisions in relation to the nation. (Finel 327)

9. Decision Makers → Foreign Policy

While foreign policy would ideally be created by both the public and its leaders, the elite

“typically enjoy a substantial informational advantage”, giving them privilege to “effectively dictate foreign policy” (Baum and Potter 56).

10. Events → Mass Media

Mass media cover events as they unfold and may then either directly report information or may frame the coverage with an autonomous agenda if the information on the event is not filtered through the elite. This coverage is often reserved for the elite media, such as the White House Press Office. (51, 53)

11. Events → Decision Makers

Decision makers may directly observe events as they unfold, allowing them to gather and frame information surround the events before later passing it along.

12. Foreign Actors → Public Opinion

Foreign actors may attempt to use a nation’s media to influence public opinion (Zhang and Cameron). For example, Russia used American social media to influence American public opinion in the months leading up to the 2016 to support the election of President Trump.

13. Mass Media → Foreign Policy

In acting as a trader of information from the elite to the public, the mass media may favor one framing of information over another, potentially resulting in an imbalance of information between the elite and public and thereby influencing whose views are reflected in foreign policy. (Baum and Potter 47, 56)

14. Decision Makers → Events

Decision makers may directly instigate events that are covered. For example, when one

nation decides to use force against another, or when a government official makes a controversial public statement about a conflict.

15. Events → Public Opinion

An event may directly “activate” public attention,” though this activation usually occurs as a result of mass media coverage.

This diagram, however, only outlines these relationships within a single nation. A better visualization of how these relationships would simultaneously exist between South Korea and Japan, is seen in the “Event Sphere” (Figure 2), a diagram composed of two conjoined Baum and Porter diagrams.




Figure 2: Event Sphere diagram

The Event Sphere replaces the “Foreign Actor” in Baum and Porter’s diagram with the other nation’s government and shows the relationships between each actor during or after the occurrence of a given event. The flows as they exist in this basic version of the Event Sphere,

however, assume an approximately equal amount of influence between each actor. In order to use the Event Sphere diagram to determine how South Korean and Japanese mass media (more specifically, news media) function in the broad “event” of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, an understanding of how strong or weak certain relationships are and where influential power is consolidated in each nation is necessary.

A Brief History of South Korean News Media

The South Korean news media’s modern history of freedom is closely aligned to the rise and fall of various systems of governance. As a colony of Japan, the Korean news media saw very little freedom. While at first newspapers readily criticized Imperial Japan, they began to quiet down in the mid-1920s when Japanese authorities began to crack down harder on opposing voices by issuing suspensions and confiscating papers (Oh and Won 9). In 1945, the end of the Japanese imperialism in Korea meant newfound freedom for the South Korean press. Under control of the United States military the nation saw “a rapid growth of newspapers of both right and left ideologies” (Kyu 896). The U.S. military did, however, instill a form of censorship to prevent the spread of communist ideals by imposing an ordinance that required newspapers to register and obtain a license to operate.

The Korean War was another moment in time during which South Korean newspapers found themselves under strict military censorship. Many newspapers in Seoul had to suspend operation while the city was briefly under control of North Korea. By 1953, papers were able to resume regular operations. During the governance of the Second Republic, South Korea once again saw broad freedoms “bordering on laissez faire” (Kyu 870). The Ordinance set in place by the U.S. military was repealed and a new registration law was set in place that made it extremely easy to publish newspapers. A brief, dark period in press freedom followed this freedom in 1961

as the military threw a coup d'état. South Korean military ended the new registration system and the Third Republic introduced a strict set of equipment and facility standards publications were required to meet. Unable to meet the standards, many so-called "pseudo" publications that had risen were forced to cease operation (Oh and Won 20). Throughout the rest of the Third and Fourth Republics' rule, newspapers were granted a number of freedoms, though some government action still kept the press under control of the government. Following the assassination of President Park and the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1981, newspapers were purged across the country until only 25 daily papers remained in operation by 1984 (Kyu 870).

During the transition towards democracy and away from authoritarian rule in the late 1980s, fewer constraints were placed on the media and the country saw a shift towards a free press. Press reform accompanied the political reform as the press was allowed to take a "more autonomous role" when the government withdrew restraints placed on the press (Yoon 87). However, some ties to the country's authoritarian past still lingered, as the press became "a new type of authoritative institution" (Young 145). The news media sought to become a "quasi-state agency" similar to a government institution through which conservative news media attempted to "restrict the development of democracy[...] to preserve a status quo that benefited wealthy elites [...] and hindered progressive change" (145-146). On the other side, more progressive press movements formed to support legislative improvements and monitor biased reporting to help develop a free press.

Today, the South Korean press remains mostly free, with a Press Freedom score in the low 30s (out of 100, where 0 indicates the most freedom possible). The South Korean constitution gives press freedom of speech, which is "generally respected in practice" (Freedom

House). As Freedom House notes, though, the South Korean government has implemented efforts over the years to censor pro-North Korean content and in more recent years has attempted to prevent news sources from criticizing government policies. Furthermore, defamation is considered a criminal offense in South Korea; reporters who criticize the government may be threatened with charges for defamation.

South Korean news media's turbulent history with censorship proves the consistent control that the government has been able to assert over the media throughout time. It has resulted in the news media's present condition of having constitutional freedom and autonomy somewhat restricted by the shadows of old authoritarianism reappearing in monitoring of and threats posed to journalists. Within the scope of the Dokdo/Takeshima conflict, the state of the South Korean news media's freedom suggests that the government exerts a moderate amount of control over the news media and may have some indirect control over how the public views the dispute and Japan's involvement in it.

A Brief History of Japanese News Media

The history of Japan's news media development is not quite as turbulent as South Korea's is. Much of the history of Japanese news media originates in Osaka. Throughout the early history of Japanese news media, two forms of papers prevailed: the *ko-shinbun*, a low-brow paper with a "plebian feel", and the *o-shinbun*, a high-brow paper that "targeted elites with high society ideals" (Kanzaki 36). In the early 20th century, papers in Osaka were seen as businesses and editors were considered something of a CEO and had control over their paper's character. In an attempt to gain more profits, editors began producing papers that combined the informational reporting of the *o-shinbun* with the popularity and accessibility of the *ko-shinbun* to produce what became known as the *chu-shinbun*. With newfound accessibility of print news that catered

towards the average reader, this form of writing eventually became the typical form of reporting news across the country. During this same period of time, the administration of Prime Minister Masatake pursued efforts to censor certain events in newspapers. Newspapers throughout Tokyo turned to represent state views and followed government orders. The papers in Osaka pushed against the censorship, however, and would continue to cover the events in an effort to maintain the integrity they had become known for until they were directly threatened; even then, they would keep returning to cover censored events. The persistence of these Osaka papers was attributed to the physical distance separating the Osaka papers from the governmental authorities located in Tokyo. Over time, as Tokyo developed to become a political, economic, and cultural center for the country, major news companies from across the country re-established their headquarters in Tokyo, leaving very few national papers in other cities and possibly increasing the amount of control that the Japanese government is able to exert over major news companies. (Kanzaki 37-38)

The 1930s in Japan saw a movement towards centralized control over newspapers by the government. The government employed press bans and raided and assaulted newspapers until they finally submitted and agreed to proposed mergers. By 1936, the Ministry of Communications finally succeeded in merging two major news companies to form one national source of state-approved news “from which practically every Japanese newspaper was forced to obtain its news” (de Lange 153). The 1940s brought about the establishment of the Newspaper League. On paper, the Newspaper League was meant to unite papers to participate in the war effort; in reality it was a means for further centralization of the news, as government officials sat on the board of the League and were thereby able to assert governmental control over the League’s actions. The Japanese Newspaper Society was also established during this time to

implement mergers and suspensions to further consolidate the news media, resulting in the loss of over 1,400 papers in only a few years. Furthermore, the government enforced legislation requiring journalists to be registered and only allowing journalists who were deemed to understand their “national mission” to continue to work with government authorities (156). These journalists were able to interact with government authorities through press clubs, which are “professional organizations that formed an indispensable link in the news gathering process” (160). These press clubs brought together reporters from major publications to directly receive news specifically on politics or economics or local news, etc. from government officials. These clubs effectively worked to keep the news media centralized and maintain governmental control over news coverage.

After the end of World War II, American forces occupying Japan prioritized liberating the Japanese press in democratizing Japan. These efforts did not last long, however, as General McArthur’s headquarters created a Press Code that prevented reporters from criticizing the Allied forces and from “publishing any items that might disturb public order or cause distrust of and dissatisfaction towards the occupation forces” (169). When the San Francisco Treaty ended occupation of Japan in 1952, it also established the end of American censorship of leftist Japanese media.

Freedom House notes that Japan’s constitution guarantees freedom of press and that this freedom is observed. Though penalties for leaking and publishing leaked information are very high, censorship of the news media remains fairly low, resulting in a Press Freedom Score in the high twenties for the past few years. Prior to 2013, when penalties for information leaks were raised, Japan maintained a score in the low 20s.

In determining Japan's press freedom scores, Freedom House takes into account the existence of press clubs, which have a contentious presence within the global news media community. The press clubs are often criticized for the close relationships they allow to be built between journalists and news sources. While it is generally typical for journalists to build a rapport with their news sources, in the case of press clubs the relationships may grow strong enough that they foster exclusionism and self-censorship. As journalists build stronger relationships with news sources, they may gain access to inside information that is not granted to other journalists. These inner circles of journalists will often take on similar views and then do not want to welcome a new person who holds differing views into their circle. Journalists who are close to their sources also will not want to get on the bad side of their sources because they want to retain access to insider information. As a result, these journalists may censor themselves and report new information with the frame preferred by the source.

Press clubs are also criticized for their role in homogenizing news coverage. When a press club meets to receive information, the information is typically dispersed in the form of a lecture. Most journalists receive the same information, resulting in monotony and minimal distinction in coverage between different newspapers.

It is clear that though the Japanese news media is free in that they are constitutionally granted freedom and are not (or at least are rarely) censored by the government. It is also clear that the history of Japan's news media has culminated in press clubs being the primary institutions for the dispersal of information to be covered in the news. These press clubs give the Japanese government a great amount of influence over what the news media cover and how they cover it. This influence further suggests that in the context of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, the news media may act in such a way that it delivers news to the public as framed by the

government, possibly allowing the Japanese government to have indirect influence over how the Japanese public views the dispute and South Korean involvement in the dispute.

The News Media's Role in Foreign Policy

As previously noted, the news media's role, at its most basic level, is to deliver information about notable events (news) to its readers. In an ideal world, that news might always be accurate and impartial, but the fact that societal and social context surrounds every news report cannot go unignored. Journalists carry personal biases they may reflect in their reports. News institutions may be swayed by other institutions and actors affiliated with them. These influences and biases are often reflected in how news is framed. In the context of the relationships between the media, state, and the public, the media may lean a little closer towards framing information with sentiments held by the public or with official state views.

Framing information with either state or public views, whether purposeful or not, promotes those views and implies that the actor whose views are being reflected had some amount of influence over the news media. As Chrystopher Kim notes, "if the media is promoting state views in order to gain access to information [...] then the media should be considered under state influence" (C. Kim 26). This is a reasonable statement given that information is often provided to the news media by the state and, as seen in the extreme case of Japanese press clubs, reporters may wish to stay on the state's good side in order to keep their access to information. Meanwhile, "if the media caters more to the public in order to make profits, while negatively framing the state, then the media is a reflection of the public rather than the state" (26). Again, this is a reasonable statement considering that privately-owned news media companies rely on profits to keep operating, and the public is the primary consumer of the news. If a company wishes to keep making profits, it is expected that the company will sell its consumers a product

that they will want to buy, so a news media company might produce news articles that reflect the views that the public wants to hear. By acting upon the influence of other actors, the news media will in turn influence other actors who have a direct role in creating foreign policy.

Additionally, the news media act as a means for creation of collective memory. Collective memory may be defined as an “amorphous and unconscious memory that directs behavior and experience in the interactive framework of a society and is that which is passed down to next generations through repeated social rituals and initiation processes” (Han 81). That is to say, it is a common understanding or belief held by a society and ingrained over time and throughout generations. As with personal memories of one’s own life, collective memory must be stored, processed, and recalled from a site. Media in all forms function as sites of memory, as they “organize, criticize, validate, and explain, giving back to people their own versions of memory” (84). Furthermore, media is able to pass collective memory down through generations, acting as a site for both storage and reception of collective memory. News media in particular act as an excellent crystallizer of memory: as time moves forward, the news media frames new events with social and historical context, incorporating new events into the greater memory.

The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, as well as the other disputes listed in Chapter 1, are examples of collective memory. The initial stance of either nation (eg. Japan’s stance that the islets are named Takeshima and belong to Japan) is reiterated and reaffirmed through a variety of processes (such as official government statements, information in textbooks, and a designated day to celebrate sovereignty over the islets) and is built upon over time (as new evidence “comes to light” that supports Japan’s claim).

As Han states, “the politics of memory in East Asia has been a struggle to define one’s identity against others’, to direct and divert blame, and to take a superior position in moral

judgement” (77). By acting as a site of memory, the news media have the ability to reinforce and pass down collective memory of a dispute, which influences how actors who are a part of the society with that memory will engage with foreign policy.

Conclusion

The model proposed by Baum & Potter shows generally how various actors in foreign affairs interact with one another. Through the model, we can see that events, decision makers (or the government), and public opinion each influence news media and that news media in turn influences decision makers, public opinion, foreign policy, and foreign actors. Modifying the model to create a new model that incorporates the actors of two countries instead of one provides a better framework to show how all these actors interact within the scope of a shared event. The modified Event Sphere shows that the mass media may influence foreign governments (whether directly or through other actors), who in turn may influence their nation’s media, public, and policy.

Understanding these relationships in conjunction with the histories of news media in South Korea and Japan, we can expect particular relationships to be stronger or weaker. For one, the Japanese government may have a great amount of influence over the Japanese news media as a result of the self-censorship that press clubs foster. The South Korean government, on the other hand, may have less control over the South Korean news media than the Japanese government does, but may still have some control as a result of the South Korean government’s ability to threaten journalists with criminal indictment for defamation. The form these relationships take are instrumental in that they determine how the news media influences other actors. Strong government control suggests that the news media will portray governmental action in a positive light and legitimize such action in the public’s eyes.

Whoever influences the news media, which serves as a site for formation and reinforcement of collective memory, will also be able to influence what collective memory is created. A higher degree of influence from the government may result in a collective memory that reflect official state views on the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. A higher degree of influence from the public, on the other hand, may result in a collective memory that reflects publicly held views that are at odds with the government's. Whatever collective memory is created will influence what decisions are made and what action is taken by actors within that society in the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute.

CHAPTER 3: QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

By analyzing three particular quantitative trends in the news media surrounding the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, I was able to determine when the most important events (from the newspapers' perspective) occurred and was able to begin to develop an understanding of how important the overall topic is to the media versus the public versus the state. As previously discussed, a single event may carry more importance to each the media, public, and state due to differing interests and agendas. An understanding of how important a given event or set of events is to each institution is integral in determining who controls which flows within the political sphere of the event.

The newspapers used for this analysis as well as for the qualitative analysis in Chapter 4 are all English-language newspapers written and published in either Japan or South Korea. The Japanese newspapers include *Jiji Press Ticker Service*, one of the English services provided by Jiji Press, Ltd, and *The Japan News* (formerly known as *The Daily Yomiuri*), which has the highest website traffic and Japanese web visitor rates of Japanese English-language newspapers at about 390,000 visitors per day in April 2019 with almost 41% of those visitors originating from Japan ("The-Japan-News.Com"). The Korean newspapers include *The Korea Times*, which has a print circulation of about 21,500 in South Korea, and *The Korean Herald*, which has a print circulation of about 14,800 in South Korea ("National Newspapers Total Circulation"). These papers were chosen primarily for being written in English, but also for their credibility and their accessibility on the Nexis Uni database.

Popularity of Dispute in News Media Over Time

To determine the most important points in time regarding this event for Japanese and South Korean news media, I used the Nexis Uni database to quantify the total number of articles


published by four newspapers every year over a span of 28 years, and the total number of articles referencing the conflict over the same span of time. To gather these datapoints, I searched all articles written for a paper within a year for any reference to “Dokdo,” “Tokto,” “Dokto,” “Tokdo,” “Takeshima,” and “Liancourt”.

Chart 1 shows the frequency of articles that refer to the Dokdo/Takeshima conflict. Coverage of the dispute by *Jiji* and *Japan News* dated as far back as 1990 but made up actually or virtually none of the papers’ articles until 1996 and 1997, after which relative coverage of the topic by both sources decreased back to virtually nothing. The Korean media sources, on the other hand, did not have any archives dated before 1998, at which point the topic had immediate though limited presence in news articles. All four sources, however, had clear increases in coverage of the dispute in 2005, 2008, and 2012, though in 2005 and 2008 the Korean papers had a much more dramatic increase in coverage than the Japanese papers did. Since 2015, there has been very little to note in terms of coverage trends.

It is pertinent to note that while there are prominent peaks and troughs in various years, the prevalent trend among all four sources is an increase in coverage since 2003. In the 15 years between 2003 and 2018, no source dropped below a 0.0078% in coverage frequency, and the troughs become progressively less and less low, suggesting that topic has become more and more important to the news media over time.

The difference in coverage frequency by national papers further suggests that Korean news media found greater importance in the topic between 2003 and 2012 while Japanese news media did not find the topic to be of any particular journalistic import until 2012, when Japanese media coverage of the dispute finally reached a similar frequency to that of Korean media.

Chart 1: Frequency of Articles Referencing Dokdo/Takeshima Conflict




To determine whether the very sharp increases in coverage by *The Korea Times* and *The Korea Herald* were only coincidental in how close and sharp they were or whether they were good representations of other South Korean news media outlets, I compared the trends found on Nexis Uni to the trends of coverage by other South Korean English-language outlets. To quantify this coverage, as these other papers were not available on Nexis Uni, I accessed the websites of each newspaper and searched for articles referencing “Dokdo”. As there was no accessible way to determine the total number of articles published by each source in a given year, Chart 2 reflects the count of articles referencing the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute rather than the portion of all yearly articles that reference the dispute.

Neither *The Korean Herald* nor *The Korea Times* appeared to represent a particular extreme in data, with the exception of *The Korea Times* appearing to publish a few more articles a year than any other publication until 2012, when the Yonhap digital archives begin, and having a sharper increase in number of topical articles published than most other publication between 2011 and 2012. The trends of both *The Korean Herald* and *The Korea Times* are reflected by

other South Korean news sources, with notable peaks in reporting on the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute occurring in 2005, 2008, and 2012, and with a notable across-the-board low point in 2003 that no news source returns to after that year. With these observations, it is apparent that the trends from the South Korean sources represented in Chart 1 are representative of overall South Korean news media trends.

Note: While I attempted to perform a similar quantitative analysis of articles published by a wider variety of Japanese news sources, I was unable to do so due to the English-language Japanese news outlets' extremely limited digital archives and website search capabilities.

Chart 2: Frequency of Articles Referencing Dokdo (South Korean English-Language Newspapers)



Importance of Dispute to News media and Public

While 2005, 2008, and 2012 were all important years in South Korean news media coverage of the dispute and 2012 was a particularly important year in Japanese news media coverage of the dispute, these datapoints only reflect when journalists and their publishers felt it was most important to shed light on an event affiliated with the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute and says nothing about who has more say over which flows in the event sphere. By comparing trends in popularity of the dispute with the public against the popularity of the dispute with the news media, I was able to determine that the popularity of the conflict with the public has a clear correlation to the popularity of the conflict in news media, that either the news media or the state

may play a role by creating Korean national identity that is tied to Dokdo, and that the news media may not have a strong influence on the public in this conflict.


I used the Google Trends website to gauge popularity of the dispute with the public. As Google has been the most popular search engine in the world since the early 2000s, and as its popularity has overlapped all of the peaks the Dokdo/Takeshima popularity in the press, Google searches hold a strong standing in this time frame as a measure of the public's curiosity on the subject and a desire to find more information on it. The values shown in Chart 3 and Chart 4 “represent search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for the given time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular [than at the value-100 time]. A score of 0 means there was not enough data for this term” (Google Trends). I searched for trends in Google searches for “독도” (“Dokdo” in Korean) originating in South Korea and for trends in Google searches for “竹島” (“Takeshima” in Japanese) originating in Japan. The values on the graph therefore reflect the popularity of either search term relative to the point in time at which one of those search terms had a popularity of 100 (in this case, “竹島” in 2012).

Trends in searches for “독도” in South Korea mimicked the trends in news articles quite remarkably. Notable peaks in the 독도: (*South Korea*) series in Chart 3 include peaks in March 2005 (relative popularity leaped from 9 in the previous month to 96 in March), July 2008 (10 to 50), March 2010 (16 to 51), February 2012 (8 to 40), and August 2012 (17 to 75). Clearly, the events popularly chronicled by news media in 2005, 2008, and 2013 align with the popularity of the subject among the South Korean public. Even smaller peaks in public popularity such as those in 2006, 2011, and 2013 are aligned with some rise or not-global-minimum points in news media coverage. Trends in searches for “竹島” in Japan proved similar results, in that the sudden

peak in public popularity in 2012 mimics 2012 peak in news media coverage, as did the smaller peaks in 2005, 2006, and 2008.

These search trends further mimic news media trends in that popularity of the conflict is more regular among South Koreans than among Japanese, indicating stronger emotions and reactions to events regarding Dokdo/Takeshima from South Koreans than from Japanese people and news media. It is possible that this is a result of public interest in the subject sparking a stronger response to events from the news media or of provocative discourse from the news media stoking reactions among the public. However, it is also probable that the state plays a role by tying events regarding Dokdo/Takeshima to a national identity embraced by both the public and the news media or that the state promotes coverage of these stories by the news media, which is then consumed and reacted to by the public.


Chart 3: Popularity of Term in Google Web Searches



In addition to looking at trends in overall Google searches, I further filtered searches down to Google News searches. Google News is a service run by Google that allows users to search specifically for news articles from any online news source. The trends in these searches, shown in Chart 4, show a much lower relative popularity for news searches than for overall

Google searches. This suggests that there is much lower public interest in searching for news from verified news sources than there is for getting simple facts and top-hit results on the main Google results page. This in turn may mean that the public does not have a particularly significant regard for news media in this conflict and that the media may not have a strong influence on public opinion.

Chart 4: Popularity of Term in Google News Searches



Partiality of News media

The use of national terms is expected of a publication that operates and circulates within that country, as those terms are the ones the readers will be most familiar with. In an international geopolitical conflict, however, one indicator of a news source's objectivity is whether or not and how frequently articles from the source refer to terms used by the other side of the conflict. Essentially, using both the national and non-national name in a conflict is indicative of an effort to be impartial, to show consideration for and awareness of both sides while still being accessible to the national audience. The less objectivity observed by the source, the more biased it becomes; when national terms are an indicator of taking a side in a conflict,

when a source uses those terms without acknowledging alternative terminology it is acknowledging its bias towards a nationalist stance on the conflict. The strength of a stance that news media may take on a geopolitical conflict is then indicative of its ties to a national identity and the state.

In his thesis, Chrystopher Kim “examined the frequency of ‘Senkaku’ and ‘Diaoyu’ [two names for the same island between Japan and Korea] to determine if any trend in the intensity of nationalism existed in each source over the dispute” (C. Kim 27). Using his methodology to determine intensity of nationalism on the Senkaky/Diaoyu dispute, I tracked and analyzed the frequency of “Dokdo,” “Takeshima,” and “Liancourt” in articles from *Jiji Ticker Press*, *The Japan News*, *The Korean Herald*, and *The Korea Times* to determine the trends of the publications’ nationalism over time, again using Nexis Uni. Due to there being some years in which there were too few articles on the dispute published to provide a reliable ratio of name usage, some years are not represented in Chart 5. Additionally, the frequency of using the term “Liancourt Rocks” was so low across the board that I did not include it in the chart for the sake of simplification.

With the exception of *The Korea Times* in 1998, each of the four sources uses the national term in virtually every article throughout time, which is to be expected of a source providing news to an audience in a given nation.


Both the Korean sources also referred to “Takeshima” in over a quarter of all articles on the subject. Over time, both sources generally trended towards less frequent use of the non-national term for the islets. A similar trend can be seen with *The Japan News*, which used “Dokdo” in over half of its articles until 2008, after which its regular references to “Dokdo” dropped to remain steadily below 25%. Interestingly, the frequency of references to “Dokdo” in

The Japan News also dropped below 50% in 2005, suggesting a more negative view of Korean ownership of the island by journalists and a higher likelihood of disregarding the Korean name for the islets.

Jiji Ticker Press' datapoints, however, stand out starkly from the other three sources. *Jiji* never comes close to dropping below a 50% Dokdo reference rate; in fact, it never drops below 67%, indicating a strong commitment to maintaining a certain level of objectivity in its reporting. This is not too surprising when the background of the source is taken into consideration, according to the *Jiji* website, "accuracy and speed are vital to [their] services, delivered to about 140 newspapers, broadcasters and publishers throughout the country and also to the general public directly via the Internet"; *Jiji* aims to act as a ticker service (as per its name), reporting stated facts without influencing the consumer's opinion ("About Us"). Despite this, there does appear to be an overall trend towards less use of "Dokdo" since 2006, which is in line with the trends of the other three news sources.

The trends in national and non-national term usage over time indicates an increasing inclination over time for the news media in both South Korea and Japan to avoid using non-national terms. As outlined above, this inclination is not just an indication of taking less care to be objective but is furthermore an indication of stronger nationalist and state-centric views being held and reported by the news media.

Chart 5: Number of Articles Referencing Takeshima and/or Dokdo out of Articles Referencing Conflict



Changes in Public Opinion Over Time

As seen in the event sphere, public opinion and news media influence one another. Public opinion may determine coverage of a topic and shape with what frame the topic is covered by the news media; news media may drive a change in public opinion on a subject. As previously noted, a clear correlation exists between public interest in learning about events in the dispute and news media interest in covering the dispute. There is also evidence to indicate rising nationalism in the media with regards to this dispute.

I referenced public opinion polls to determine the general opinion each nation's public had of the other nation and then whether those views correlated with increased nationalist views in the news media. Public opinion for 2003-2006 was gathered from the Asia Barometer poll. Japanese public opinion of South Korea from 2007 onwards was pulled from polls from the Cabinet office of Japan and reflect the views of several thousand adults from across the country. Data on the South Korean public opinion of Japan was pulled from the Pew Global Attitudes and Trends polls for the years 2007, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017, and 2018. For the year 2016, South Korean public opinion data was pulled from the Genron NPO *Japan-South Korea Joint Public*

Opinion Poll to make up for missing 2015 data from the Pew poll. Data on South Korean public opinion was unavailable from 2009 to 2012 from any available sources.

As shown in Chart 7, South Korean and Japanese public opinion of the opposite nation was relatively high until at least 2004; negative opinion was under 30% for both nations in 2003 and 2004, though positive opinion dropped and neutral opinion rose in 2004. By 2006, however, negative opinion skyrocketed. South Korean negative public opinion of Japan rose by 20.2 percentage points and Japanese negative public opinion of South Korea rose by 28.4 percentage points.

Chart 6, though, shows that public opinion seemed to be on the repair between 2007 and 2008, when Japanese positive public opinion of South Korea outweighed negative public opinion by almost 4 percentage points and South Korean negative public opinion of Japan was at only 51%. Between 2008 and 2013, however, South Korean public opinion of Japan dropped dramatically, with negative opinion rising to 77% in 2013. Japanese public opinion of South Korea saw an increase and stayed positive from 2008 to 2011, but dramatically dropped between 2011 and 2012, when negative public opinion reached nearly 79%. While each nation's public opinion of the other has trended towards being slightly more positive since 2014, there was a slight increase in negative public opinion in 2017, though nothing particularly notable; and both nations' general public opinion of each other does remain mostly negative.

Chart 6: Public Opinion 2007-2018





Chart 7: Public Opinion 2003-2006



There does appear to some correlation between public opinion and the frequency of news articles on the dispute, national term usage, and public interest in the dispute. 2005, when there was an increase in coverage of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute by Japanese and Korean news sources, was followed by a drop in public opinion. Similarly, Japanese public opinion of South Korea dipped in 2010, the same year in which South Korea saw a local peak in Google web and news searches and in which there was a minute rise in news coverage. The clearest correlation of data is in 2012, when news coverage and public interest surged but public opinion fell. Finally, the general trend in decreasing negative public opinion correlates with the general trend in increasing coverage and decreasing use of non-national terms by the news media.

South Korean and Japanese public opinion of each other's nations is certainly influenced by events other than the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute (the dispute is far from the only existing dispute between the two countries), but a drop in public opinion is indicative of overall stronger nationalist views held by the South Korean and Japanese publics regarding the other nation. This means that increased public nationalism regarding Korean-Japanese relations is correlated with increased nationalism in the news media regarding the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute.

The question that then arises is if a causal relationship exists alongside this correlation and, if so, who influences whom in the relationship. Does public opinion drive nationalism in the news media? Or do news media drive nationalism in the public? What role to decision-makers – governments and politicians – play? Do the stances of decision makers drive nationalism in the public, in turn causing increasingly nationalist news media? Or do decision makers more directly influence news media and the news media in turn drive public opinion?

CHAPTER 4: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

As shown in Figure 3, the media act as a transporter of nationalism, allowing for state and popular nationalisms to challenge and reinforce one another. The weight of flows, or how strong state-controlled nationalism is versus grass-roots nationalism in promoting nationalism in media and how much of that nationalism the media conveys to another party, may be determined using a qualitative, critical discourse analysis of news articles covering important major related to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute.




Figure 3: Media as the Transporter of Nationalism (C. Kim 15)

The critical discourse analysis I use takes historical, political, and social contexts into consideration in order to determine the extent to which the public drives grass-roots nationalism in the media as well as the extent to which decision makers drive state-controlled nationalism in the media. These contexts are crucial to determine how each party is impacted by the relationships outlined in Figure X, as they provide an understanding of why a certain topic is being covered by the news media, whether the presence or content of the coverage is out of the norm, and what impact the events covered have. For example, an election may give rise to certain coverage surrounding the Dokdo/Takeshima conflict that sheds either a favorable or

unfavorable light upon a particular candidate, which may indicate influence by a political party or a candidate over the media. Likewise, the impact a particular event has on a public may result in the news media providing coverage that does not align with the views of decision makers. Additionally, understanding the historical context of a given event provides insight to the collective memory that may be influencing the perspective of the news media's coverage.

In my analysis, I also determine the partiality of news articles. I consider whether the news articles have an impartial tone and act simply as a means to deliver new information to readers, or whether they have an impartial tone and act to influence the readers' view of a subject. To make this determination, I examine the word choice of each article, asking questions such as, "Is it sensationalist," "Does it condemn a person," "Does it condemn the other country," and "How does it characterize actions taken by individuals or governments?" I also consider the nature of what is covered (whether a news source chooses to cover only the major events, or whether they pick a bone with minute incidences) in determining partiality.

The apex of the critical discourse analysis asks who benefits from the coverage. Together, the context behind and partiality of the news media coverage are indications of bias, which may benefit a certain party and serve to transport their form of nationalism to other parties. Should an article reflect a political official's viewpoints and parrot their rhetoric against another country, it will benefit the political official (a decision-maker) and act as a transporter of state-controlled nationalism to the public. Should an article instead denounce the government's actions and voice views popularly held by citizens not affiliated with the government, it will benefit a part of the public and act as a transporter of grass-roots nationalism. On the other hand, an article may simply recount an important event without seeming to take a side on any affiliated

issues and act only to deliver information to readers, allowing them to interpret the news as they wish with minimal influence and not benefitting any particular party.

1996

In 1996, the primary event driving news coverage of the Dokdo/Takeshima conflict in Japanese papers was the Japanese government's decision to establish a 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which encompassed the islets in question, in early February. The decision came about after local fishermen pressured the government to create an EEZ "to prevent 'damage'" from South Korean and Chinese fishing boats that operated in the same waters (Ue). However, this decision also arose concern that it would worsen relations with South Korea. Additionally, possibly in retaliation to this decision, South Korea declared it would build a breakwater along one of the Dokdo islets. South Korea's declaration was met with protests from the Japanese government.

Japanese news coverage of the EEZ with respects to the islets was neutral for the most part, though some articles by both papers had stronger sentiments against South Korea's claim to the islets and the South Korean people's engagement on the subject. The most notable Jiji article uses slightly stronger language than other Jiji articles, such as "claiming the island simply belongs to South Korea" and "[Republic of Korea] insists" ("ROK Insists Move on Disputed Isle Legitimate"), indicating a belief that the South Korean claim has no substantial support. Articles from The Japan News were less neutral overall than those from Jiji. Though reporters maintained a professional tone, some made a point to note the "strong anti-Japan sentiments among the South Korean press and people" (Ishizuka) and reflect the Japanese government's stance on sovereignty of the islets by stating that South Korea "occupies" Dokdo/Takeshima ("Japan Protests Takeshima"). While the news articles were mostly just informative in nature, the stances

voiced on the sovereignty of the islets and sentiment against South Korea helps to legitimize the creation of the 200-mile EEZ.

No articles from either Korea Herald or Korea Times were available for 1996.

1998

Fishery agreements between South Korea and Japan drove coverage of Dokdo/Takeshima in 1998. In September of that year, the two nations created a fisheries agreement that demarcated maritime boundaries for South Korean and Japanese fishing boats after Japan voiced a strong desire to end the previous fisheries pact. Previous fisheries agreements either kept the area surrounding the islets exclusive to Korean fisheries or shared the area. The last fisheries/EEZ agreement was made in 1965 and included a shared fishing zone surrounding Dokdo/Takeshima similar to the one found in the 1998 agreement. The agreement included a joint fishing area surrounding the islets as part of a compromise to allow South Korean boats access to what is known as Taehwatoe fishing grounds, which has a good cuttlefish catch.

As Korea Herald and Korea Times report, concern rose from both countries over the possibility that the joint fishing area could lead to further territorial dispute prior to the decision of a shared fishing area. As previously discussed, the establishment of EEZs and fishing zones can establish sovereignty over islets. The agreement as it stands avoids giving either nation a stronger claim of sovereignty over the islets; once the agreement was solidified, dissatisfaction with the agreement rose from both South Korean papers, suggesting that there had been hope in South Korea that the agreement would set Korean sovereignty over the islets in stone.

Articles from the Korea Times were critical of South Korean government representatives' decisions on the fisheries agreement. There was worry that the representatives were not taking proper measures to secure sovereignty over the islets. One criticism reads, "South Korea allowed

Tok-do Island to be included in the joint fishing area, heralding possible future disputes regarding sovereignty,” and cites the concerns of analysts over what the agreement could mean for the future of the dispute (“Seoul, Tokyo Agree”). Other articles make statements such as, “the government negotiators’ approach was at odds with the dominant public view” (“Tok-do’s Status Remains”). Even articles from the Korea Herald, which were more impartial than those from the Korea Times, voiced concern over the agreement. One editorial made the case that the government acted hastily. On the other hand, a few articles such as one that reads, “Korea [...] maintained a low-key approach regarding the islets, while Japan tried to turn the area into a disputed territory,” (“Mission Completed”) placed blame on Japan for demanding the creation of a new fisheries agreement, suggesting that Japan’s goal was to reignite the dispute. These articles also highlighted civic action and public sentiment with notes such as, “no Korean denies the fact that the islets [...] belongs to Korea” (Seoul, Tokyo Agree on New Fisheries Pact), “Tok-do [has also been] the subject of internal controversies between Korean government officials and citizens,” and “The Korean fishing industry is moving to hold massive protest rallies” (“Tok-do’s Status Remains”).

Overall, the articles were very critical of President Moon’s surety that including the islets in the shared fishing area would not “affect the status of the islets in terms of international law” (“Seoul, Tokyo Agree”) They were passionately written and highlighted public disapproval of both South Korean and Japanese government decisions. The articles did support civilian involvement in the matter, giving voice to public sentiments rather than governmental ones.

Articles from Jiji and The Japan News referring to “Takeshima” at this time were not related to the territorial dispute.

2004

In January 2004 the South Korean Postal Service Office (PSO) issued a postage stamp featuring an image of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets. According to the PSO, the stamp was one of a series of stamps meant to promote environmental awareness in South Korea. The Japanese government took offense to the stamps, arguing that they promoted international recognition of the islets as South Korean territory (“Japan Asks Korea to Stop”).

While this event was the main driver for news coverage of the islets in 2004, it did not appear to be of particular importance Japanese newspapers. Articles from Jiji and The Japan News relating to this issue contained very impartial and unobtrusive content. Coverage merely included updates on the event and included statements made by the South Korean PSO and by Japanese government officials without including subjective interpretations or imbalanced coverage of either parties’ actions.

Korean newspapers, meanwhile, were strongly partial to South Korean governmental claims and actions. Both Korea Herald and Korea Times covered the event extensively but rarely noted Japanese arguments and frequently quoted impassioned remarks made by South Korean government officials against Japanese claims and actions. Some articles further made sure to note that Japan’s response to the stamps added fuel to South Korean civilians’ fire against the South Korean government for not taking a hard-enough stance on sovereignty over the islets. One article reads, “officials [...] complain the public is reacting too emotionally to the regional issues, making it increasingly difficult for them to resolve the disputes more swiftly” (Kim So-young).

2005

In February, a bill to designate February 22 as “Takeshima Day” to celebrate and raise public awareness of Japan’s claim to the territory was proposed in the Japanese parliament shortly after South Korean President Roh renewed claims for compensation for damage from imperial Japan, especially that done to “comfort women”. In March, new Japanese textbooks are proposed that refer to Dokdo/Takeshima as “Takeshima” and state that the islets belong to Japan but that South Korea has laid claim to them. In the midst of these issues, Japan proposes bringing the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute to the International Court of Justice but is ultimately turned down by South Korea.

The Korea Herald and Korea Times primarily covered Japan’s proposal for a “Takeshima Day”, and the dispute over Japanese textbooks. There was very minimal coverage of Japan’s request to bring the territorial dispute to the ICJ. Most articles covering these topics were passionate. With phrases such as, “igniting an explosive anti-Japanese movement,” “chapters glorifying Japan’s colonization” (Lee Joo-hee, “Seoul Demands”), “hush up atrocities” (“Japan Ups Surveillance”), “a denial of history and rationalization of its invasion” (Lee Joo-hee, “Korea to Add Pressure”) Korean articles became more sensationalized than before. Though many articles still avoided such sensationalizing language, a proud and passionate tone still resonated throughout the articles. Most, if not all, articles sided with the official Korean stances on each of the events: Japan does not own the islets and so should not be celebrating sovereignty over them, South Korea is still entitled to compensation from Japan including official sovereignty of Dokdo, and the Japanese government is wrong to allow textbooks to declare that Japan owns the islets. Though never stated outright, it is most likely that the concern over the textbooks, which are meant for middle school students, is due to a fear of Japan reinforcing the Japanese collective

memory of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute in an impressionable new generation of Japanese citizens. Declaring a Takeshima day and publishing textbooks declaring sovereignty over the islets would further socially establish Takeshima as Japanese territory within the Japanese public, which would be a detriment to South Korean efforts to officially claim the islets. Rather than reading as fearful, however, the consistent insistence that Japan was in the wrong on every point regarding the islets cemented a passionate tone in the Korean news media.

Meanwhile, Jiji and The Japan News carried less of a passionate or proud tone and more of a righteous and demeaning tone. In many articles covering the proposed Takeshima day and the textbooks, Japanese news articles also referred to the remarks made by President Roh, who was known to have a bad relationship with Japan. Jiji articles, usually very impartial, remained minimally moved and mostly neutral when referring solely to the textbooks or Takeshima Day, but were strongly accusatory and demeaning when referring to the President's remarks. One Jiji article blatantly states, "Japan's lack of understanding was only matched by Roh's lack of diplomatic skills" ("The Relationship Between"), and others make more subtly-demeaning statements such as "Roh, who lambasted Koizumi for visiting a shrine honoring convicted war criminals" ("Koizumi Signals Willingness") and include indirect quotes such as "Sasae said Japan strongly urges South Korea to refrain from such acts that fuel resentment between the people of the two countries" ("Japan Protests Against").

While Japan News articles remained mostly neutral when covering the proposed Takeshima Day, they employed much stronger rhetoric to demean South Korea in coverage of the dispute over textbooks and when referring to President Roh's remarks. One article notes that Roh's speech used "the people's anti-Japanese sentiment as a trump card to buoy their approval rating" (Asano). Another quoted the Education, Science, and Technology ministry saying that

noting Dokdo/Takeshima as contested territory ““could mislead students””; this quote, under the heading “Setting kids right on Takeshima” insinuates that South Korea not only wishes to promote their claim to the islets, but also wishes to mislead the middle school students of Japan (“Advance Items Approved”). A third article further declares that “textbooks are something to be selected by each of municipal governments based on their independent judgement. That subjective decision should never be affected by external pressure” (Tomidokoro), effectively voicing resentment towards South Korea for forcing its way into Japanese affairs. Both The Japan News and Jiji reflected the official stances of the Japanese government on these issues, but unlike the South Korean newspapers, they rarely featured remarks from civilians but instead only noted what government officials had to say with regards to why South Korea is in the wrong on the issue of sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima.

2006

In 2006, a series of events regarding surveying waters around Dokdo/Takeshima spurred limited yet consistent news media coverage of the islets. Between April and September, Japan had announced and called off a maritime hydrographic survey, South Korea had announced and called off a similar survey, Japan announced a plan to investigate radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan, and South Korea and Japan came to an agreement to conduct a joint investigation. Coverage of these events were very neutral and much less passionate or accusatory than a lot of the coverage from the previous year.

The subjects of Takeshima Day and Japanese textbooks came back to light in 2006 when the first Takeshima Day was celebrated in February and when the Japanese education ministry “[demanded] publishers make it clear in high school textbooks that the Takeshima island group is part of Japanese territory” (“South Korea Protests at Japan”) in March. As with the case of

maritime surveys, coverage of Takeshima Day remained fairly minimal and neutral, though a handful of Korean articles noted the South Korean government's protests of the celebration. Though there was less coverage of the textbook dispute by Korea Herald and Korea Times than there had been in 2005, the tone remained fairly consistent with that of 2005, as the articles voiced resentment towards the Japanese government for wanting to teach Japanese students that Dokdo/Takeshima belongs to Japan. The Japan News, while similarly remaining mostly neutral on the subject, did feature an editorial that took a righteous stance against South Korean anger at Takeshima Day. The author claims that, "for its part, Japan has done nothing more than lodge protests, presumably because it considers it would be inappropriate to provoke Seoul to anger," insinuating that South Korea has taken much more drastic action with the intent of provoking the Japanese "to anger" ("Govt Should Take Lead"). The editorial strongly supports the Japanese government, toting how Takeshima Day had increased interest in the islets over the previous year. On the subject of textbooks, The Japan News was very neutral and provided very little coverage. Jiji remained mostly impartial and kept a very neutral tone in its coverage of both topics.

2008

2008 saw another surge in news media coverage of the islets, especially in South Korea, due primarily to two events. In May, the Japanese government announced that Takeshima would be defined as Japanese territory in teaching manuals, driving news coverage by Japanese and South Korean papers both. On July 29, the United States decided that for its purposes, the islets had undesignated sovereignty, spurring a reaction from South Korea and its news media.

Korea Times and Korea Herald featured a number of editorials and passionate articles relating to the Dokdo/Takeshima islets in 2008. Many of these articles called for stronger policy

relating to Dokdo. One of these articles declared that “Tokyo rekindled a century-old dispute with Seoul,” and that “officials have faced a fierce public backlash for not taking measures that could have prevented the U.S. naming agency’s recent change of heart” (“P.M Visits Dokdo to Defend”). Another article highlighted actions taken by the Korea Federation of Teachers’ Associations to supplement any government action taken to push education on South Korea’s sovereignty of the islets. A third article noted a desire for stronger governmental action by unnamed sources who stated, “[South Korea’s] foreign policy staff may face disciplinary measures and replacements” (“Seoul to Push U.S.”) after the U.S. classified the islets as having undesignated sovereignty.

Japan News articles expressed some resentment towards both the Japanese and South Korean governments. Many articles viewed the South Korean government as petty, noting that Japan’s ultimate decision not to describe Takeshima as an “integral part of [Japan’s] territory” was out of “consideration of South Korea’s feelings” (Kato) and “reflects a desire not to offend South Korea” (“Takeshima Mentioned”). They furthermore note such sentiments as a “hope that Seoul responds to the matter calmly” (“Teach the Truth”). One article additionally ended on a line noting that some of 200 protesters outside of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul “threw eggs at the Embassy building” (“Takeshima Mentioned”), highlighting what may be seen as an immature act by South Korean protestors. Some articles, however, did not seem thrilled with the Japanese government’s decision, actually highlighting the fault of both nations in letting the curriculum guide get in the way of positive bilateral relations by noting how relations had “improved since the inauguration of President Lee Myung Bak but the bud of friction is threatening to blossom” (Harada). Harada stops just short of overtly criticizing the Japanese government, however, and places heavier blame on South Korea and the President’s desire to

cause greater tension between South Korea and Japan. While Jiji articles remained mostly neutral, some did take a similar (though less heated) position to most Japan News articles.

2010

There were few events in 2010 regarding the Dokdo/Takeshima islets that spurred much coverage by either Japanese or South Korean media. Most articles from Korea Times and the Korea Herald that included the term “Dokdo” did not reference the territorial dispute. One event that did somewhat pique the interest of the news media that year was a report from the Yomiuri (now known as The Japan News) claiming that President Lee had told Prime Minister Kan to hold off on making another claim to the islets in new textbooks as the time was not right, in a supposed show of support for Japanese sovereignty of the islets. Though the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry denied the report, nearly 2,000 South Koreans filed a lawsuit against Yomiuri for damage to personal pride and self-esteem (Lee Ho-joon). The suit was eventually dismissed because, as the court noted, “the legal interests of the plaintiffs were not violated as they were not mentioned in the report,” (Do). While toned down from the reports of 2008, reports by both South Korean papers continued to highlight the passion and activism of South Korean citizen. They also did not hold back from criticizing the South Korean government and political officials. After the case was dismissed, one article quoted an attorney who declared, “We plan to take legal action against President Lee” (Lee Ho-joon), shifting the blame previously placed on the Yomiuri onto President Lee.

Meanwhile, Jiji and The Japan News had very little focus on any particular issue regarding the islets, though there was slightly more coverage on the postponement of a Japanese defense report, which included a map of Japan that included Takeshima. Reports from The Japan News suggested that the delay was meant to not upset South Korea so close to the 100th

anniversary of Japan annexing the Korean peninsula. These articles strongly resented the decision, reporting the delay was a sign that Prime Minister Kan “does not take territorial issues, which can be described as the substance of the nation, seriously enough” (“Defense Report Release Delayed”). An editorial stated, “We feel all this could adversely affect the Japan-South Korea relationship. The Kan administration made the wrong decision about the release of the report” (“Defense Report Delay Unnecessary”). Jiji articles, on the other hand, made no attempt to interpret purpose behind the delay and in fact stated that Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku “said he knows nothing about any such consideration” for South Korea in the decision (“Japan Announces Delay”).

2011

In 2011, news coverage of Dokdo/Takeshima was primarily driven by South Korea banning Japanese politicians from entering the country in August. The politicians had announced their intention to visit the recently erected Dokdo museum in July and were warned that if they went forth with the visit, they would not be granted entry into the country. When they landed in South Korea in August, they were detained at immigration and were sent back to Japan later that day. Two other events prompting attention from South Korean news media included an announcement in March of new middle school textbooks identifying Dokdo/Takeshima as Japan’s territory and Japan renewing its claim to the islets in its Defense Ministry’s annual white paper.

South Korean news articles—especially those from The Korea Herald—on blocking the Japanese politicians from entering the country carried a prideful and passionate tone. Phrases such “dismissing Tokyo’s claim [over the islets] as nonsense,” “providing a stumbling block to mending ties with Korea” (Shin Hae-in), and “triggered by the Japanese legislators’ recent

tirades” (Park, “Korea May Deny”) created sensationalism in the articles, as did coverage of events as small as the politicians ordering bibimbap while being detained at the airport. Many articles also noted the role the public played in the event, saying that the politicians were blocked because South Korean government officials “could not guarantee their safety as anger persists among the people” (Shin Hae-in) and recounting how protesters were “braving the rain” at the airport.

Overall, the South Korean articles strongly supported South Korean government action on the subject. Only one editorial criticized President Lee’s decision, arguing that it was inappropriate and that they should have been given a police escort from the airport to the museum. This criticism, though, does not come without sentiment against the Japanese politicians. In stating that “the politicians’ acts were very provocative and cunningly premediated” and that they were “descendants of A-class war criminals” (Shim), Shim asserts that by not allowing them entrance to the country, President Lee played right into their hands and allowed the visit to become a much larger deal than it otherwise might have been.

Coverage of the new Japanese textbooks remained almost entirely neutral in tone, but coverage of the Japanese defense white paper claim, which was published shortly after the politicians’ attempted visit to South Korea, took a strong stance against Japanese governmental action. One article stated that “South Korea has long believed it has no reason to overreact and draw international attention” (Shin Hae-in) to the islets; other articles voiced similar sentiments about how Japan’s continuous claims to the islets brought unnecessary attention to the dispute (something that Japan has similarly scolded the South Korean government for doing, though the articles did not acknowledge this).

Coverage of Dokdo/Takeshima from Japanese sources was much sparser than from South Korean sources. Almost all of the articles in 2011 came from Jiji; The Japan News only had eight articles that referred to the islets. As per usual, Jiji acted as an impartial and non-sensationalized news source. The few articles from The Japan News were also very evenly toned, save for the couple of editorials. The editorial that covered South Korea's denying the Japanese politicians entry carried strong anti-Korean sentiment, saying that the events were "disconcerting" and "a snub to Japanese request for self-restraint" ("South Korea Goes Overboard"). This editorial was, however, an exception to the rule with regards to partiality and tone in 2011 Japanese news coverage.

2012

The last high peak in news coverage on the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute was fueled primarily by President Lee's visit to Dokdo/Takeshima in August – the first time a South Korean leader had ever visited the islets. After the visit, Japan again proposed taking the dispute to the ICJ, spurring further coverage. Some smaller events, including a Korean soccer player displaying a political message about Dokdo/Takeshima at the Olympics in August and another dispute over textbook content in March, further added to the number of news articles covering the dispute in 2012.

The rhetoric used in South Korean news articles in 2012 was strong and centered around bolstering South Korean pride. On the subject of President Lee's visit to Dokdo, reporters used unattributed phrases such as "Tokyo's increasingly assertive territorial claim", "Japan clandestinely annexed Dokdo" (Shin Hyon-hee), "Japan's colonial atrocities", "presaging retaliatory action", "Seoul spurned it" (Song, "Japan's P.M Sends Letter"), and "undercutting better ties" ("Effective Control of Dokdo") to make a strong statement about Japan's attitude

towards the entire dispute. Articles across the board held anti-Japanese sentiments and, unlike articles on other subjects, covered very little public reaction to Japan's anger over President Lee visiting the island. These articles also neither criticized nor lauded President Lee for his actions. Instead, articles from both The Korea Herald and Korea Times appeared to use President Lee's visit as a springboard for voicing frustrations against Japan. Even when President Lee's visit was directly celebrated, it was twisted in a way that brought attention back to Japan's claim to the island. An exemplary article reads, "Lee's visit may mark a shift from Korea's longstanding policy to keep itself from entangling in Japan's ambition to make Dokdo a disputed area" (Shin Hyon-hee). A few articles observed the attitude of Japanese citizens towards the issue, which Japanese news sources tend to avoid doing, noting "growing anti-Korea sentiment" in Japan (Lee Hyo-sik) and highlighting public activism such as a man throwing a rock at a window of the south Korean consulate building in anger over President Lee's visit to the islets (Song Sang-ho).

South Korean coverage on Japan proposing taking the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute to the ICJ further criticized Japan for making the dispute too big of a deal and too public on the international stage. Reporters noted that the Japanese government had restrained from suggesting bringing the dispute to the ICJ out of consideration for the bilateral relationship between the two nations, but that Japanese officials felt "such consideration [had] become unnecessary" (Song Sang-ho), suggesting that Japan no longer cared to keep a positive relationship with South Korea.

Meanwhile, Japanese coverage of President Lee's visit turned a bitter attitude on the President, blaming him for preventing a better relationship between the two nations from forming. Jiji, typically a very neutral news source, published an article stating that his visit "threw cold water on such efforts to repair the relationship" ("S. Korea Lawmakers Visit"). The Japan News was passionate in its coverage, publishing editorials claiming that "Lee spoiled his

progressive reputation” and that he had “now crossed the line” (“Lee’s Visit to Takeshima Threatens”). The paper also published articles observing that “Lee apparently [wanted] to show the South Korean public a hard-line stance” (“Lee Visits Takeshima Islets”) on Dokdo/Takeshima and that the President’s decision to return letters regarding the visit to Prime Minister Noda ““may prove that the nation is shocked by Japan’s objections”” to Lee visiting the islets (“Lee Returns Noda’s Letter”). The rhetoric used in these articles demeaned President Lee and South Korea, suggesting that Lee’s visit did not succeed in showing a hard line stance and that South Korea had naively not foreseen a negative reaction from Japan over the visit.

Regarding bringing the dispute to the ICJ, news continued to be passionate, taking a proud tone. Articles from The Japan News stood solidly in support of the Japanese government’s offer to take the dispute to court and noted that Japan stood a good change in court, citing the San Francisco Treaty as “compelling evidence in favor of Japan’s insistence” (“Taking Island Row”). Jiji again had a surprisingly partial take in some of its coverage and took a hit at South Korea, voicing sentiments such as that the country had “consistently argued that there was no territorial dispute over” the islets (“S. Korea Refuses to Bring”). These articles, in addition to those covering President Lee’s visit, shed a negative light on South Korea and insinuated that the nation does not want to bring the conflict to a close but is rather trying to spur further conflict over the islets.

Evaluation

Over the years, South Korean news media sources were usually passionate in reporting on the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute. Even in years with less coverage of events relating to the dispute, both The Korea Herald and Korea Times consistently covered public action on and opinion of the events. Many articles would quote civilians in addition to government or other

officials and would make sure to note when the public protested Japanese or Korean governmental action on the dispute. South Korean news media also readily criticized the South Korean government and government officials, though Korea Times did so a little less frequently than the Korea Herald did. While official governmental views were usually quoted in and supported by both sources, they were often accompanied by reflections of public sentiment towards the government, whether positive or negative. Coverage clearly went beyond strict, objective reporting of events; reporters regularly made subjective statements unattributed to any source and gave overt suggestions for how those in power should handle an event. By covering civilians' heated protests and opinions, and by regularly criticizing government action, the news media acted as a voice for the public, bringing their anger, concerns, and ideas to light to ensure that decisionmakers in the government hear them.

Given this understanding of how the South Korean news media covered the dispute, it appears that the South Korean news media act as a transporter of popular nationalism from the public to the state most certainly within the scope of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, but also possibly on a broader scope. This is not to discount, however, the news media also transporting elite nationalism to the public; while that relationship does exist, it is not quite as notable as the strong relationship between the public and the news media in comparison to the relationships that exist between the Japanese public, news media, and government.

The two Japanese news media sources varied in the tone of their coverage. Jiji Press Ticker Service was almost always very impartial and neutral in its articles, preferring to act as a direct line of information to readers. On a few, rare occasions though, Jiji used stronger rhetoric to reflect a similar tone to that seen in many articles from The Japan News, voicing strong agreement with Japanese government action and strong anti-Korean sentiments. These

passionate articles did not appear with every major event relating to the dispute, but when they did appear, they usually criticized and demeaned South Korean governmental stances and actions. Despite readily criticizing the South Korean government though, both Jiji and The Japan News were very hesitant to criticize the Japanese government actions and governmental officials in these articles. In fact, the only criticisms of Japanese government actions came from The Japan News editorials, which should be expected to be much more inflammatory than regular articles. These two papers also very rarely mentioned any action taken by or views held by the general population of Japan. Very rarely did any quotes come from anyone besides analysts and Japanese and Korean government officials, and if any action was taken on the part of Japanese civilians in relation to the dispute, it went unnoticed by either news source.

Japanese news coverage is a direct stream of information from the government to the public and bolsters Japanese government stances by bashing South Korean activity while neutrally or positively framing Japanese government actions for readers. In this capacity, the Japanese news media act as a transporter of elite nationalism from the state to the people, with very little nationalism being transported from the public to the state in coverage of the Dokdo/Takeshima conflict. Considering the existence and effects of Japanese press clubs, however, it is quite likely that this relationship also exists in news coverage of other subjects.

The relationship between news media and the public is then very different between the two nations. While in South Korea the public has a very strong influence on the news media and much of the nationalism in the relationship between the public, news media, and the state originates in the public, in Japan the public has very little influence over the news media and much of the nationalism in the three-party dynamic originates in the state.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Findings

Figure 2 below shows the Event Sphere diagram with modified relationship flows to demonstrate the strength of influence in each relationship as determined through the quantitative and qualitative analyses.




Figure 4: Event Sphere diagram with modified flows

The relationships shown in Figure 2 are described in relation to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute as follows:

South Korea Hemisphere	Japan Hemisphere
1&2 Public opinion has a stronger influence on media than media does on public	Japanese media has a stronger influence on public opinion than public opinion has on

<p>opinion. The media criticizes the South Korean government and highlights public action and opinions—both of these items indicate media being influenced by public opinion. The media delivers public-derived popular nationalism to the government.</p>	<p>it. State views are promoted in media coverage of the dispute, indicating that the media is not influenced by the public but rather by the state. The media delivers Japanese state-derived elite nationalism to the public.</p>
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3&4	<p>The media has a slightly stronger influence on the South Korean government than the government had on the media. The media readily criticizes the government and in the qualitative analysis does not appear to be constrained by the government. However, given that the media still often supports government views and understanding the constraints on press freedom that exists in South Korea, it is not possible to say that the media has a strong influence over the government nor that the government has no influence over the media.</p>	<p>The Japanese government has a strong influence the media. State views are heavily promoted in media coverage indicating state influence. It is unclear exactly what degree of influence the media has over the government, but it is not particularly large, given an understanding of the dynamics created by press clubs and given that Japanese media has only criticized the government in regards to Dokdo/Takeshima on a handful of occasions. Any elite nationalism that originated in the state was reflected in Japanese news coverage for reception by the public.</p>
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<p>5&6</p>	<p>Public opinion appears to have a strong influence over the government. As covered in the articles, activists loudly protest when they are discontent with government decisions. These requests are clearly heard by the government, even drawing a complaint from government officials in one article. The public calls for harder stances and the government usually reacts by taking a harder stances on the dispute. The government does not appear to have a strong influence over public opinion. Regardless of elite consensus, if the public generally thinks the government was bending to Japan's stance, they will voice their dissent with the government.</p>	<p>It is unclear from the analyses exactly what the direct relationship between Japanese public opinion and the Japanese government looks like.</p>
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<p>7</p>	<p>Neither analysis sought to uncover the relationship between public opinion and foreign actors as it was not conducive to determining the role of news media in the dispute.</p>
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<p>8</p>	<p>Neither analysis sought to uncover the relationship between the media and foreign actors, nor was there any indication in the analyses that either country's media had any impact on the others' governments.</p>
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9	The South Korean government takes increasingly stronger hard-line policies against Japanese claim to the territory over time, seemingly in response to demands from the public and the media.	The Japanese government's foreign policies regarding the islets vary widely between hard-line stances and requests to settle the dispute through international courts. The policies do not particularly reflect any influence coming from either public opinion or the media.
10	The occurrences of events relating to the dispute drive increased South Korean media coverage of the dispute, but information on the events usually come filtered through government officials rather than through unmediated coverage.	The occurrences of events relating to the dispute generally drive increased Japanese media coverage of the dispute, but information on the events usually come filtered through government officials rather than through unmediated coverage.
11&14	As should be expected, South Korean government officials are usually both direct observers to and instigators of events surrounding the dispute.	As should be expected, Japanese government officials are usually both direct observers to and instigators of events surrounding the dispute.
12	The Japanese government does not appear to attempt to influence South Korean public opinion.	The South Korean government does not appear to attempt to influence Japanese public opinion.

13	Any influence the South Korean media has on foreign policy is indirect, through the government.	Any influence the Japanese media has on foreign policy is indirect, through the government, though it does not appear as though the Japanese media have much indirect influence on foreign policy.
15	As per the quantitative analysis, the occurrences of events relating to Dokdo/Takeshima increases public interest in the dispute, though this “activation” usually occurs as a result of South Korean news media coverage.	As per the quantitative analysis, the occurrences of events relating to Dokdo/Takeshima increases public interest in the dispute, though this “activation” usually occurs as a result of South Korean news media coverage.

Ultimately, the primary role of South Korean news media in the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute beyond providing information is to transport views and nationalism from the public to the state thereby influencing foreign policy and acting as a check on the South Korean government. As outlined previously, the delivery of public views to the state can influence the state to make foreign policy decisions that are in line with public opinion. The primary role of the Japanese news media in this dispute is to transport nationalism from the state to the public by promoting Japanese government action in addition to informing the public of recent events.

Interestingly, the roles the two nations’ news media take on allow them to cement the collective memory of their respective nations regarding sovereignty of the islets. In the case of Japan, the frequent writing-off of South Korean claims to the islets and criticism of the South Korean government whenever it demands or protests action adds to the narrative ascribed in the

collective memory that the islets belong to Japan and have since before South Korea laid any official claim to it. Similarly, the South Korean news media is able to cement the collective memory that the islets belong to South Korea and that Japan wrongfully continues to lay claim to them by angrily writing off Japanese claims and criticizing the South Korean government for any action it takes that could potentially lead to loss of sovereignty and the end of the collective memory as it presently exists.

Going Forward

It is important to note that the newspapers used for this study are all English-language newspapers operating in countries where the national language is not English. It is likely, then, that a fair portion of their audience is not domestic. This may influence what freedoms they may have or what restrictions are placed on them through their relationship with the government as well as what the expectations of their audiences are and what each news sources may gain from reflecting certain views in their coverage.

Given the print circulation of the paper domestically and the breakdown of average daily website traffic by visitor origin, the primary readership of The Korea Herald, The Korea Times, and The Japan News (information for Jiji Press is unavailable) as shown in Table 1, it is clear that the majority of readership for each source is international, not domestic.

News source	The Korea Herald		Korea Times		The Japan News	
Print domestic circulation (“National Newspapers”)	21,514		14,779		Unavailable for English paper	
Average daily web traffic (SimilarWeb)	37,000		48,000		390,000	
Domestic web traffic	11.66%	4,314	11.84%	5,683	40,72%	158,808
International web traffic	88.34%	32,686	88.16%	42,317	59.28%	231,192
Total domestic daily readership	25,828		20,462		158,808	

Table 1: Average Daily Domestic and International Readership

As these newspapers have very different audiences than papers written in Korean or in Japanese, it is worth considering how political and social contexts for these papers might be different than the contexts for Korean- and Japanese-language papers. Considering how data gathered on the South Korean papers showed a freedom of press (e.g. frequently criticizing the government) that was not reflected in the Freedom House Press Freedom statistics nor the background on the South Korean news media, it seems likely that the government may constrain Korean-language newspapers more than it does English-language newspapers. Further research into the specific policies governing newspapers and the intention behind those policies, the informal ways the Japanese and South Korean governments try to control the news media, and what autonomous agendas English-language papers may attempt to set in each country is needed to gain a more accurate understanding of how the papers used in this thesis function within the sphere of the Dokdo/Takeshima conflict as compared to how local-language papers would function.

Further considerations for future research include restructuring the Event Sphere model and determining the status of relationships that were not thoroughly uncovered in this thesis. Foreign policy, for example, impacts international events and is not simply a stagnant dead-end in flows of influence; it may also be more aptly considered a part of government as governments are effectively the only immediate creators of foreign policy. Additionally, relationships unique to this dispute may be discovered with a more thorough understanding of the differences between English- and local-language newspapers as well as of certain relationships, such as those existing between public opinion and foreign policy.

It is clear that this dispute carries a great amount of weight for both South Korea and Japan. To outsiders, though, the dispute might seem petty. Even given the context of the valuable

fishing waters and potential natural gas the dispute may not quite make sense, as the nations have come to a joint fishing zones agreement several times over without much of an issue and the technology required to access the natural gas remains undeveloped. Considering the history that exists between the two nations, however, the dispute appears to be more than just a heated disagreement over unclear international law and lucrative fishing waters.

The dispute is a symptom of a much larger divide between the two nations that runs deep into their shared history. The islands serve as a physical reminder to South Korea of what they lost and what pain they endured as a colony of Japan. To Japan, the islets also seem to be a point of pride, not wanting their claim to Dokdo/Takeshima to be added to the list of wrongdoings from their imperial era.

Considering this, as well as the multiple attempts by Japan to bring the case to the International Court of Justice; both nations' attempts to resolve the issue between the two of them; and the current state of relations in regards to the dispute between the public, state, and news media in both nations; it is unlikely that the dispute will be solved through just joint foreign policy initiatives or international law. Instead, I propose that a change in narrative by the news media must occur in both nations.

As discussed, the news media are a great player in the creation and maintenance of collective memory. In South Korea, where public sentiment will likely need to change in order to allow the government to come to an agreement with Japan, the collective memory is being largely built by public ideals echoed in the news media. By changing how the news media frames events surrounding the Dokdo/Takeshima islets, the South Korean collective memory of the islets may begin to change. In Japan, the government has the greatest amount of power over the dispute. News media would need to push back harder against government action to begin

prompting a change in viewpoint that would allow the government to begin shifting the Japanese collective memory on the subject.

These changes may allow more flexible mindsets in the South Korean public and the Japanese government that would be open to the consideration of the two nations beginning to make thoughtful amends with one another despite their historical divides, and possibly determine who will retain sovereignty of the Dokdo/Takeshima islets going forward. This is not a clear or certain step towards resolving this dispute, though. A new event, a change in governmental administration, the intervention of actors outside of South Korea and Japan, or another unexpected change may have a significant impact on the relationships found in this thesis. Further research may also return significant findings that would prove a much more effective means for the eventual resolution of the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute.

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